Resource Management in College Athletics

Introduction

College athletic programs spend significantly more money per student-athlete than higher education institutions spend academically per full-time student. Spending on student-athletes occurs primarily in facility building, such as the construction or remodeling of stadiums/arenas, training facilities, locker rooms and extracurricular spaces specifically for student-athletes, and on top-of-the-line coaching staffs to keep up in the growing arms race in college athletics (Bauer-Wolf, 2018; Desrochers, 2013; Hoffer, Humphreys, Lacombe, Ruseki, 2015). Although the perception among many individuals is that college athletics provides a large amount of money for their institution, this thought is often not reality. College athletic programs generated $10.3 billion of revenue in 2018 and spent billions of dollars in revenue on top-of-the-line athletic facilities and coaching staffs (“Finances of Intercollegiate Athletics,” 2019). However, spending on these items has proven to have no significant impact on the long-term success of these athletic programs (Tsitsos & Nixon, 2012).

Furthermore, despite athletic departments spending billions of dollars on athletic facilities and coaching, many athletic programs still have more expenses than revenue generated solely by the program. According to the NCAA, in 2017, only 24 Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) schools continue to exceed the revenue that they produce, continuing a trend seen in recent years (Burnsed, 2015). This bleak reality exists even though 13 institutions made over $100 million in revenue during 2014, a number that has more than doubled to 27 schools in 2017 (Gaines, 2017). With many athletic programs operating at a net loss, a majority of non-power five athletic programs (programs not within the ACC, SEC, Big 10, Big 12, Pac 12, and SEC) and athletic programs in the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) rely heavily on student fees to help cover expenses created by these programs (Wolverton, Hallman, Shifflett, & Kambhampati, 2015). These data points show that while athletic programs within higher education institutions are generating large sums of money that continue to grow, many programs still fail to cover all of its expenses.

Proponents who advocate for athletic spending to continue at its current rate cite educational and athletic benefits that athletic spending provides. These benefits include increased applications for the institution by prospective students, a higher quality pool of student applications, and positive brand recognition by prospective students and their families (Tsitsos & Nixon, 2012). However, research has shown that increased athletic spending has not led to positive, long-term impacts in these areas, despite many individuals believing in these ideas to be true (Tsitsos & Nixon, 2012). Even though increased athletic spending frequently requires student fees to subsidize their programming, this increase in spending does not often lead to many measurable, significant, and long-term academic or athletic benefits, meaning college athletic programs must be more responsible when allocating financial resources, just like many academic departments and organizations on college campuses.

Athletic vs. Academic Spending

It is no secret that Division I college athletics is big business, as many institutions spend more copious amounts of money to keep up in the spending arms race occurring in collegiate athletics (Hoffer, 2015). Even though higher education institutions invest significantly more financial resources in academics than in athletics, as athletic budgets for Division I schools typically represent five to eleven percent of their total institutional spending, this statistic does not tell the whole story (Conger, Gerstner & Vogel, 2018; Desrochers, 2013). On average, college athletic programs spend much more per student-athlete than Division I higher education institutions spend to educate the average student (Desrochers, 2013). For Division I institutions with no football (DI-NF), the average academic spending per full-time equivalent student is $11,861, while the average athletic spending per student-athlete is over three-and-a-half times higher at $39,201 (Desrochers, 2013). The same is true for Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) institutions as the average academic spending per full-time equivalent student is $11,861, and the average athletic spending per student-athlete is at $36,665 (Desrochers, 2013).

Although the ratio of average athletic spending per student-athlete to average academic expenditures per full-time equivalent student at DI-NF and FCS institutions already raises cause for concern, the ratio is even higher for Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) institutions. At FBS institutions, the average academic spending per full-time equivalent student is $13,628, while the average athletic spending per student-athlete is over six-and-a-half times as high at $91,936 (Desrochers, 2013). Specific power five conferences spent even more than six-and-a-half times on athletic spending per student-athlete than on academic spending per full-time equivalent student in 2010 (Desrochers, 2013). For example, The Southeastern Conference (SEC) had the highest ratio of athletic spending per student-athlete to academic spending per student, spending 12.2 times more on athletic expenditures per student-athlete than on academic spending per full-time equivalent student.

Furthermore, academic spending per full-time equivalent student has not increased at the same level as athletic spending per student-athlete has increased in all three Division I subdivisions. Academic spending per full-time equivalent student from 2005 to 2010 increased 11 percent at DI-NF institutions, 22 percent at FCS institutions, and 23 percent at FBS institutions (Desrochers, 2013). In comparison, athletic spending per student-athlete from 2005 to 2010 increased 39 percent at DI-NF institutions, 48 percent at FCS institutions, and 51 percent at FBS institutions (Desrochers, 2013). With many higher education institutions participating in FBS or FCS athletic conferences also classified as R1, R2, or R3 doctoral institutions according to the Carnegie Classification system, it reflects what these institutions truly value. This data shows that many of these institutions believe it is necessary to spend more per student on college athletics than it is to spend per student on scholarly and research activities that align closer to many of these institutions' mission, vision, goals, and values.

Revenue Distribution

Difference between Revenue Distribution in Professional Sport and Collegiate Sport

Distributing revenue within college athletics is significantly different than in professional sports. In professional sports, revenue is spent in four key areas: (1) Paying and increasing player salaries via collective bargaining agreements between players and owners, (2) Revenue sharing among team owners, (3) Reinvestment in athletic facilities, (4) Paying and increasing coaching staff salaries (Blue, 2020). However, because college student-athletes have “amateur status” according to the NCAA, student-athletes do not earn salaries. Instead, many student-athletes often receive full-cost of attendance scholarships that cover academic expenses, athletic expenses, and room and board expenses (Blue, 2020). Additionally, there are no owners of college athletic programs, meaning that there is no form of revenue sharing among owners. As a result, college athletic programs primarily distribute its revenue through the reinvestment in athletic facilities and by increasing coaching staff salaries once student-athletes scholarships are covered (Blue, 2020). The limited manners in which college athletic programs distribute its revenue outside of providing scholarships for student-athletes has created an arms race in the areas of facility development and hiring premier coaching staffs within college athletics.

Head Coaches Salaries

Compensation for collegiate men’s basketball and football head coaches is a primary issue in the revenue spending arms race occurring in college athletics (Conger et al., 2018). Athletic programs within higher education institutions are trying to acquire and retain talented head coaches in these sports in a short-term attempt to elevate its programs or in a long-term effort to continue its status as one of the top programs in college athletics (Conger et al., 2018; Tsitsos & Nixon, 2012). In 2010, University of Alabama football head coach Nick Saban led all college football coaches in earned compensation, making $5.16 million with the opportunity to earn up to an additional $800,000 in performance-based compensation incentives (Tsitsos & Nixon, 2012). According to USA Today (2019), Clemson University football head coach Dabo Swinney was the highest-paid college football head coach in 2019, earning $9.32 million in total compensation. During the past ten years, there has been over an 80 percent increase in total compensation received among the highest-paid college football head coaches.

In 2010, University of Louisville men’s basketball head coach Rick Pitino made the highest salary in men’s college basketball, earning $6.1 million (Tsitsos & Nixon, 2012). According to USA Today (2018), University of Kentucky men’s basketball head coach John Calipari was the highest-paid men’s college basketball head coach in 2018, earning $9.28 million in total compensation. During the past nine years, there has been over a 50 percent increase in total compensation received among the highest-paid men’s college basketball head coaches. Additionally, a trend of an arms race for top-level head coaches is now occurring in women’s college basketball, with top head coaches earning over $1 million in base salary per year (Tsitsos & Nixon, 2012).

Despite the belief held among many individuals that higher-paid head coaches in collegiate sports leads to more athletic success on the field, this result is not always the case. Orszag and Israel (2009), conducted a study that failed to find a relationship between the salaries made by head coaches in men’s basketball and football and their winning percentage. More significantly, Tsitsos & Nixon (2012) performed a study that showed from the data collected that there is no evident relationship between the salaries of top football and men’s basketball head coaches and expected benefits, such as athletic program upward mobility and stability. In highly competitive environments, such as men’s college basketball and football, not even high-priced head coaches can guarantee that their abilities will lead to short-term and long-term success for athletic programs (Tsitsos & Nixon, 2012).

Looking at six consecutive seasons in college football from 2006-2011, 48 percent to 56 percent of the top 25 highest paid head coaches finished outside of the Associated Press (AP) Top 25 Poll in any given year during the six individual seasons (Tsitsos & Nixon, 2012). For the six consecutive seasons in men’s college basketball from 2006-2011, 40 percent to 56 percent of the top 25 highest paid head coaches finished outside of the AP Top 25 Poll in any given year during the six individual seasons (Tsitsos & Nixon, 2012). This data shows that large portions of the highest-paid football and men’s basketball head coaches consistently failed to finish inside of the AP Top 25 poll in any given season out of the six consecutive seasons studied from 2006-2011. When observing long-term mobility for college athletic programs, the number of the top 25 highest paid head coaches in football and men’s basketball who experienced upward mobility from 2006-2011 was not significantly higher than the number of head coaches who experienced downward mobility from 2006-2011 (Tsitsos & Nixon, 2012). The findings of these studies show that athletic programs trying to achieve short-term and long-term athletic success in football or men’s basketball should not turn to highly paid head coaches. Despite the widespread perception that highly paid head coaches contribute to athletic success, there is no evidence that

higher head coach salaries lead to better winning percentages, increased consistency in the AP top 25 poll, or upward program mobility within an individual sport.

Facilities

A primary way that most collegiate athletic programs attempt to keep up in the ever-growing arms race taking place in college athletics is through the building or renovation of facilities used by student-athletes (Hoffer, 2015). Examples of facilities that receive constant updates by college athletic programs include stadiums/arenas, training facilities, locker rooms, and extracurricular spaces specifically for student-athletes. For FBS athletic programs, 20 percent of generated revenue goes towards the construction or remodeling of existing athletic facilities and additional equipment (Desrochers, 2013). Although the percentage of revenue going towards athletic facilities and equipment is not as high for non-FBS programs, FCS and DI-NF programs still spend 16.6 percent and 14.9 percent respectively towards facility building and equipment (Desrochers, 2013). According to the NCAA, almost $10 billion in revenue was generated by Division I athletics programs in 2018. Therefore, it is likely that Division I college athletics programs are spending over a combined $1 billion a year on athletic facilities upgrades and improvements.

It is no surprise that athletic programs with premier men’s basketball and football teams are leading the way in facility building to recruit elite high school students. In 2018, Clemson University completed a $55 million-dollar athletic complex exclusively for football players (Bauer-Wolf, 2018). Non-football related amenities include a small bowling alley, a slide, pool tables, arcade games, and a full-sized miniature golf course (Bauer-Wolf, 2018). The University of Oregon opened a $68 million-dollar football facility in 2013, complete with a barbershop, hot-tub, and sixty-four 55-inch televisions that can all link together to show one image (Bauer-Wolf, 2018).

Although it might not surprise many college athletics supporters that elite athletic departments are building state-of-the-art facilities for its student-athletes, less dominant programs are beginning to follow in their footsteps. Northwestern University, known more for its academic prestige than its athletic dominance on the field, just completed construction on a football practice and athletics facility that will also accommodate both the men’s and women’s soccer team, the women’s lacrosse team, and other university events (Bauer-Wolf, 2018). Sitting on the shore of Lake Michigan, the $270 million facility contains many lavish amenities, such as curtains controlled by remote control, video cameras controlled by joysticks, a barrier to divide a practice room into two separate rooms, one for offense and one for defense, and hot and cold tubs that can seat up to 40 football players each (Bauer-Wolf, 2018). Northwestern athletic officials viewed the facility as necessary to compete with other top programs within the Big 10 conference and hope that their investment into the facility bears lucrative recruits that translates to winning on the field (Bauer-Wolf, 2018). Although only time will tell if Northwestern made a wise decision, its football program in the 2019 season lost six more games than in 2018 and finished with a record of 3-9, its lowest winning percentage since 1998 (“Northwestern Wildcats School History,” n.d.).

Once viewed as an arms race for athletic programs only in a power five conference, smaller athletic programs are also beginning to spend big-time money in athletic facilities in hopes of building a stronger athletic program. In 2018, the College of the Holy Cross opened the newly renovated Hart Center and Luth Athletic Complex, costing $95 million (Smith, 2019). The new athletic facility includes a full-sized turf practice field, new or updated locker rooms for ten teams, and 3,000 square feet of sports medicine space for its 700 student-athletes and 27 teams (Smith, 2019). With smaller colleges and universities spending large amounts of money in building state-of-the-art athletic facilities, other schools will likely follow suit, believing that it is one of the few ways left to attract talented recruits to its program and achieve on-field success.

Subsidization of College Athletics

Despite the fact NCAA Division I college athletics has generated almost $10 billion in revenue, and many athletic programs have partaken in a spending spree to hire elite-level coaches and build state-of-the-art athletic facilities, many college athletic programs are still not turning a profit. This net-loss has led many higher education institutions, specifically those of FBS or NI-DF standing, to turn to student fees and other subsidies to help fund college athletic programs and the arms race that it has created (Cheslock, 2015). From 2010-2015, public universities have generated more than $10.3 billion of required student fees and other subsidies into the athletic programs (Wolverton et al., 2015). During this period, the average athletic subsidy paid to support athletic programs has increased 16 percent, and student fees, which make up almost 50 percent of all subsidies used to help fund college athletics, increased by over ten percent (Wolverton et al., 2015).

Although the word subsidy often has a negative connotation, subsidies are not necessarily a bad thing in higher education. Institutions in higher education use subsidies to support a wide variety of activities, programs, and departments because they help the institution to meet its mission statement, goals, and objectives (Cheslock, 2015). However, continuing subsidy increases in the form of student fees and institutional support, currently occurring in college athletics, is difficult to sustain for the long-term health of many higher education institutions (Cheslock, 2015).

Subsidy rates for college athletic programs are often highest at FCS and NI-DF institutions, where ticket sales and other revenue generated are often the lowest (Wolverton et al., 2015). As a result, students who have the least amount of interest usually end up paying the highest amount of student fees to help support these athletic programs. For example, in the state of Kentucky, Morehead State University, an FCS program, generated 86.2 percent or approximately $9.3 million of its revenue from subsidies in 2015 (“Who Foots the Bill in College Sports,” 2015). Northern Kentucky University, which moved from NCAA Division II to NCAA Division I- No Football in 2013, received 84.6 percent or $10.1 million of its revenue from subsidies in 2015 (“Who Foots the Bill in College Sports,” 2015). Additionally, many institutions that rely on subsidies to fund its athletic programs also tend to serve poorer populations than other institutions that can depend on more outside revenue (i.e., ticket sales, sponsorships, more substantial donations) for sports (Wolverton et al., 2015). During the 2012-2013 academic year, the 50 higher education institutions that provided the largest amount of subsidies for college athletics averaged 44 percent more Pell Grant students than the 50 institutions that provided the lowest amount of subsidies for college athletics (Wolverton et al., 2015).

Although many institutions that used to rely on student fees were FCS and NI-DF programs, several institutions with FBS and power-five athletic programs either utilize subsidies to fund college athletics or have seriously considered using subsidies as a way generate additional revenue. In 2014, student fees for athletics at the University of Virginia generated $13.2 million per year and rose from $388 in 2004 to $657 in 2014, almost a 70 percent increase (Hobson & Rich, 2015). Without the increase in subsidies from student fees, the University of Virginia would not have the ability to cover its budget, according to former UVA Athletic Director Craig Littlepage (Hobson & Rich, 2015). Under Craig Littlepage’s tenure as Athletic Director from 2004-2014, coaches pay increased from $8.6 million in 2004 to $18.1 million in 2014, and costs on facilities rose from $2.5 million per year in 2004 to $15.2 million per year in 2014, with all 2004 figures adjusted for inflation (Hobson & Rich, 2015). Additionally, other major FBS athletic programs have proposed student fees to help subsidize college athletics before receiving significant pushback. Texas A&M University proposed a $72 a year student fee to help pay for a $450 million football stadium renovation before student protests shut the idea down (Hobson & Rich, 2015). Additionally, Clemson University’s athletic director proposed a $350 student fee to help Clemson keep up with the competition but received pushback from the student government (Hobson & Rich, 2015).

With the ever-growing amount of college athletics that is funded by subsidies, many proponents of using student fees and other subsidies for college athletics say it is necessary to keep up with the competition and make their institution a destination campus for prospective students. The President at Georgia State University, whose athletic program recently moved from DI-NF to FBS, said that “great research universities tend to have great athletic programs,” and that a great athletic program is necessary to increase applications at the institution (Wolverton et al., para 40, 2015). However, the increase in subsidies for college athletic programs is coming at a significant cost to the mission statements of many higher education institutions. According to Rutgers University professor David Hughes, student fees and other forms of subsidies towards college athletics undermine universities in separate ways (Wolverton et al., 2015). Increases in student fees makes college more expensive for the average student, while rising institutional subsidies towards college athletics show what many higher education institutions think is more important (Wolverton et al., 2015). By subsiding college athletics through both student fees and institutional support, institutions have “students paying more for a lower-quality education” (Wolverton et al., para 48, 2015).

The Other Side

There is no doubt that athletic success on the field translates to short-term benefits for higher education institutions. For example, after the University of Maryland Baltimore County (UMBC) pulled off the greatest upset in NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament history against number one ranked University of Virginia, the institution gained multiple benefits (Mayes & Giambalvo, 2018). First, UMBC saw a 27 percent increase in prospective students that took official campus visits by September in comparison to the previous year and were already experiencing significant growth in applications to the university (Lopresti, 2018). Second, UMBC received a substantial boost in positive brand recognition, appearing in approximately 4,700 news articles around the world and had over 3,000 t-shirt orders from its bookstore in the 24 hours following the upset (Lopresti, 2018). Lastly, there was a notable increase in pride following the win against the University of Virginia from both current students on-campus and alumni, (Lopresti, 2018).

Additionally, higher education institutions often receive a significant boost in applications to their school after winning a national championship in men’s basketball or football (Mayes & Giambalvo, 2018). After winning the national championship in men’s basketball in 2012, the University of Kentucky received a boost in student applications, and Clemson University also saw a slight increase in applications after winning the national championship in football during the 2017 season (Mayes & Giambalvo, 2018).

This phenomenon, known as the Flutie Effect, often provides higher education institutions with significant short-term benefits in aspects such as an increase in application, positive brand recognition, and increased donations by alumni after pulling off a major upset or winning a championship in college sports (Mayes & Giambalvo, 2018). The Flutie Effect is not foolproof, as sometimes higher education institutions experience no significant benefits or increase in interest after pivotal sports moments (Mayes & Giambalvo, 2018). Despite the uncertainty of the Flutie Effect, a survey by the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics (2006) showed that 55% of respondents believed that athletic success translates to a long-term increase in both the number and quality of student applications (Tsitsos & Nixon, 2012). Furthermore, the results of the survey showed that 84 percent of respondents believed that successful athletic teams generate more long-term donations (Tsitsos & Nixon, 2012). However, these beliefs concerning applications and donations appear to be myths as existing research provides little-to-no support for these claims (Orszag & Israel, 2009). While there is little doubt that athletic success provides short-term benefits in these areas especially in the area of increasing student applications, as it does not appear to offer long-term benefits in the areas of receiving a higher quality pool of student applications or increased donations from alumni (Tsitsos & Nixon, 2012).

Financial Reform in College Athletics

Leaders in higher education have called for financial reform in college athletics for over 90 years. The idea of financial reform in college athletics first started with the 1929 Carnegie Foundation Bulletin number 23 on Intercollegiate Athletics that called for increased faculty involvement in the oversight of finances in college athletics (Lawrence, Ott, & Hendricks, 2009). Further calls for reform in college athletics have also focused on faculty involvement in the financial aspects of college athletics, such as budgeting (Lawrence et al., 2009). According to a study performed by Lawrence et al. (2009), one-half of faculty have indicated there is a greater than 50 percent chance that they would want to participate in a campus-based athletics financial reform effort. However, out of the faculty members surveyed in the study, only one in ten believe that participating in a reform effort would bring significant financial reform to college athletics on their campus (Lawrence et al., 2009). This research shows that while many faculty members in higher education believe that financial reform in college athletics is necessary, they do not think it would produce significant results.

One recommendation made to achieve significant financial reform within college athletics is to increase the level of transparency of financial operations in college athletics (Lawrence et al., 2009). According to Lawrence et al. (2009), about half of all faculty members interviewed in the study were unsure if their institution subsidized college athletics, and “slightly more do not know if faculty governance committees advise administrators during the budget process for athletics” (p. 79). This increased transparency will allow for the regular production of clear, concise, and comparable data on finances in college athletics, allowing faculty, staff, and administrators to better understand the sources of revenue and in what aspects college athletic programs spend its revenue. Another recommendation is for athletics budgets to be consistent with the mission and budget of the institution (Lawrence et al., 2009). Following this recommendation will allow higher education institutions to meet the unique needs of its student population, allowing its student population to experience holistic growth, an essential part of the college experience.

The last recommendation, made by sports economist Andrew Zimbalist (2006), argues that college coaches should not have the ability to earn more than the president of the institution that they are coaching. Zimbalist (2006) argues that this rule would allow higher education institutions to allocate institutional resources efficiently and would more accurately convey an institution’s mission statement. Furthermore, Zimbalist (2006) argues that if this rule became reality, a mass exodus of coaches to other occupations would not occur as many college coaches would be unlikely to find higher-paying jobs within the marketplace. However, given the current landscape of college athletics, it is doubtful that the NCAA would pass this rule.

Conclusion

Despite the belief that many college athletics programs are self-sustaining, this thought is not the reality for many college athletics programs across the country. Although Division I athletic programs spend billions of dollars on elite coaches and state-of-the-art athletic facilities, they also rely on student fees and other forms of institutional subsidization to achieve these means. Furthermore, higher education institutions spend more on athletic spending per student-athlete than they do on academic expenditure per full-time student equivalent, with FBS institutions spending over six-and-a-half more times per student-athlete than non-student-athlete (Desrochers, 2013). This ratio in spending and the subsidization of college athletics through student fees goes against the mission, vision, values, and goals of many higher education institutions with some faculty members believing that students receive a less valuable educational experience. Even though increased athletic spending frequently requires student fees to subsidize their programming, this increase in spending does not often lead to many measurable, significant, and long-term academic or athletic benefits, meaning college athletic programs must be more responsible when allocating financial resources, just like many academic departments and organizations on college campuses.

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